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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF
THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AS
GUARANTEED
BY
BOTH
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I of the Utah Constitution impose procedural due
process restrictions on government's power to proceed against
individuals and their property.

Implicit in the concept of

procedural due process are the guarantees that the forum will be
fair and reasonable and that the defendant will have an
opportunity to appear and defend against the action.
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that Federal due process
requirements assure, to the extent possible, that the defendant
will have an opportunity to be put on notice of pending legal
action and to have the opportunity to present defenses.

Carlson

v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987).

Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a
mechanism whereby due process guarantees are implemented.
Service of process implements the procedural
due process requirement that a defendant be
informed of pending legal action and be
provided with an opportunity to defend
against the action.
Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d at 1271.
1

Defendant asserts that the plaintiffs1 failure to comply
with Rule 4 has violated the defendant's procedural due process
guarantees of both the United states Constitution and the Utah
Constitution,

Additionally, as a result of the failure to comply

with Rule 4, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a
default against the defendant.
The defendant recognizes that while personal service of
process guarantees that the defendant will be notified of pending
legal action, the United States Supreme Court as well as the Utah
Supreme Court has held that actual notice is not always
necessary.

Thus, procedures to effect service other than by

personal service have been adopted such as that found in Rule
4(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
If the person to be served refuses to accept
a copy of the process, service shall be
sufficient if the person serving the same
shall state the name of the process and offer
to deliver a copy thereof.
Defendant asserts however that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that the defendant Pizzello refused to accept a copy of
the process.

In order for Rule 4(i) to be harmonious with the

procedural due process guarantees, the Rule must be utilized when
it is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
appraise the interested party of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to participate in the action.
2

Mullane

v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct.
652, 657 (1950).
Defendant asserts that he should have been appraised of the
action and given an opportunity to defend the action.

Defendant

did not refuse to accept service and the trial court improperly
concluded that service was refused.

At worst, defendant refused

to answer his door.
The trial court assumedly relied upon the Utah Court of
Appeals decision of Wood v. Weening, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App.
1987), to assist it in concluding that service had been obtained
under Rule 4(i) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Wood v.

Weening decision is distinguishable from the present facts and
defendant refers the court to the defendant's original brief for
further discussion of the Wood decision.
Although the defendant had been unable to cite authority for
the proposition that silence or inactivity may not constitute a
refusal, a Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision held
that a process server must bring the question of due process
within the purview of the person to be served.
In the Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of Davis
v. Museler, 713 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1983), defendants moved to
vacate a default judgment based upon, among other reasons,
defective service.

In Davis, the plaintiff engaged the services
3

of a private investigator to locate the defendants Museler and
Maloney.

According to the investigator1s affidavit of service,

the investigator arrived at the Museler/Maloney residence and was
greeted at the front door by a woman who roughly fit Maloney1s
description.

However, the woman denied ever having heard of

Jacqueline Museler.

After briefly consulting with the man who

was working on the front lawn and who confirmed that "this is the
Museler residence", the investigator returned and knocked again.
This time he was met by a man who claimed to be "Joe Marshall"
but who produced a business card bearing the name of "C.
Bellammy".

Having seen enough, the investigator asserted that

the man at the door was Joseph H. Museler and advised that he had
subpoena and deposition notices as well as summons and complaints
for him and Jacqueline Maloney.

When the man refused to accept

service, the investigator informed him that he was leaving the
papers on the railing at the front door.
On appeal, the defendants raised the issue that the lower
court's denial of a motion to vacate the default judgment was in
error based upon improper service obtained by the plaintiff.

The

defendants submitted affidavits at the lower court indicating
that they were not at home on the day of the alleged service.

In

considering the defendants1 motion to set aside the default based
upon improper service, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
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With respect to personal service, however, we
believe the defendants1 motion raised
sufficiently serious questions of fact to
warrant an evidentiary hearing under New York
law . . . We recognize that New York have
traditionally and wisely had little tolerance
for the type of gamesmanship that plaintiffs
claim took place here. It is thus well
settled under New York law that where a
defendant refuses to accept service, the
papers may be left in his general vicinity.
[Citations omitted.] But a process server
who adopts this course of action must bring
"the questioned due process within the
purview of the person to be served"
[citations omitted], since "the defendant
must be made aware that he or she is in fact
being served with process." Thus, even if we
were to accept that the Vassalotti
[investigator] affidavit at face value, we
could not necessarily conclude that Maloney
had been properly served. [Citations
omitted.] For these reasons, a hearing must
be held before it can be determined whether
the motion to vacate should be granted on the
grounds of defective service."
Id. at 914.
Recognizing that the preceding case relies upon New York
law, it is significant to note that the court held that the
defendants must be made aware they are in fact being served with
process.

There has not been a decision before the Utah Supreme

Court or the Utah Court of Appeals wherein the court has upheld
service where the process server simply stated the name of the
process and offered to deliver a copy thereof without
encountering some individual who could at least put the person to
be served on notice.
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Defendant asserts that without some further evidence that
there was a refusal by the defendant to accept service, the trial
court abused its discretion in concluding that there was a
refusal and that service was appropriate.

Defendant was denied

due process as guaranteed by both the United States Constitution
and the Utah Constitution.
POINT II
DUE PROCESS IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND
VIOLATION CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT ON
APPEAL.
Defendant recognizes the general rule outlined in the brief
of plaintiff that issues raised for the first time on appeal
which were not raised before the trial court will not be
considered on appeal.

Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979),

Brief of Appellant, Page 14. However, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that where fundamental rights and jurisdictional issues are
raised, even for the first time on appeal, the same will be heard
by the Court.
As to the first argument, plaintiff contends
that the Act violates Article VI, Section 28
of the Utah Constitution. Issues not raised
at trial cannot be raised on appeal. This
general rule applies equally to
constitutional issues, with the limited
exception of where a person's liberty is at
stake.
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Pratt v. City Council City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah
1981); see also, In re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110
(1963).
The constitutional arguments raised by defendant Pizzello
clearly affects the defendant's liberty and due process and
therefore is appropriate for review by this Court.
POINT III
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT PROMULGATED A RULE
REQUIRING SHOWING OF MERITORIOUS DEFENSE PRIOR
TO RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS A VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS BOTH UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Plaintiffs attempt to minimize the defendant's argument that
the Utah Supreme Court's requirement of showing a meritorious
defense as set forth in the opinion of State By and Through the
Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1983), constitutes an unconstitutional denial of due process by
distinguishing the facts of the United states Supreme Court
decision in Paralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 s. Ct.
896, 99 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1988).

Plaintiffs argue that the critical

facts in Paralta are not present in the instant case.

Plaintiffs

emphasize that the Court's holding in Paralta arose from the fact
that Paralta had never been properly served and therefore had
never had proper notice.
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However, defendant's argument in the present case that the
requirements of Musselman violate both Federal and State
constitutional due process guarantees are based upon the Utah
Federal District Court decision of Gary Fassio v. The Honorable
Maurice Jones and Collection Management Agency, Inc., No. 88-C965G (D. Utah 1989), in which there was proper service upon the
defendant Gary Fassio in the underlying collection action.

(See

Addendum C, Brief of Appellant, Memorandum Decision and Order in
Fassio v. Jones, et al.).
In Fassio, the court in its memorandum decision summarized
the facts of the underlying action in the Third Circuit Court of
Salt Lake County.

As noted in the memorandum decision, Fassio

was properly served with the summons and complaint but believed
that the matter had previously been resolved and therefore failed
to file an answer.

With proper service upon Fassio, the

Honorable Judge J. Thomas Greene concluded that promulgated
procedural rule of court imposed by the Utah Supreme Court in
Musselman imposing the showing of a meritorious defense, in
addition to the other requirements of Rules 55 and 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure before a default judgment can be
vacated, was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the due
process clause of the United States Constitution.
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Defendant recognizes that the record is void as to what was
the basis for Judge Daniels denial of defendant's motion to set
aside the default judgment.

However, inasmuch as the Musselman

decision was the most current guidance offered by the Utah
Supreme Court for a lower court in determining whether or not a
motion to set aside a default should be granted, it must be
assumed that Judge Daniels relied upon the Musselman decision in
denying defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment in
the present action.
It would appear clear from the Fassio decision, which the
defendant recognizes as not binding upon this Court, that the
promulgated rule offered in Musselman is a violation of due
process of law if the showing of a meritorious defense is imposed
in addition to the procedural requirements which would otherwise
justify setting aside the default judgment.
The defendant in the instant action was denied due process
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the default judgment
should be set aside based on the deprivation of said rights.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default
judgment entered against defendant Pizzello.
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The trial court

abused its discretion in concluding that the defendant was served
pursuant to Rule 4(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court's error constituted a violation of the
defendant's due process guarantees of both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Utah Constitution.
Additional due process guarantees were violated by the
procedural rule promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court in the
Musselman decision, requiring a showing of a meritorious defense
prior to granting relief from default judgment.
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully request
that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to
set aside default judgment.
DATED this /? j 7<t^ day of November, 1989.
STRONG & HANNI

By

Joseph 0j Joyce
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the rTI

day of November, 1989, I

caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT to be served upon the following by depositing copies

10

in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows;
Kenneth A. Bronston
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

11

84102

